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In light of international scrutiny, what might be next steps toward redress for the Korean 
and other World War II Military Sex Slaves, in terms of strategic framing of their claims to 
reparatory justice? More particularly, viewed through a lens of American redress experiences, 
and particularly the U.S. apology and reparations for the Japanese American World War II 
internment, what might human rights tenets of reparatory justice offer established governments 
faced with challenges to their legitimacy as democracies in the face of unredressed human rights 
transgressions?
Redressing the wounds of injustice has become a matter central to the future of civil 
societies. Whether a country heals persisting wounds is increasingly viewed as integral, (1) 
domestically, to enabling it to deal with pain, guilt and division linked to its past in order to 
now live peaceably and work productively, and (2) globally, to claiming legitimacy as a 
democracy genuinely committed to human rights (which affects a country’s standing on 
international security and responsible economic development.) People and governments – 
especially democracies with histories of human rights abuses– all have a stake in justice that 
repairs. 
This larger stake in democratic legitimacy that a country like Japan has – especially as it 
seeks to expand its influence in international security – lies at the heart of this assessment of 
strategic future paths toward “Comfort Women” redress.
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I. Prologue
“I can no longer tolerate the lies of the Japanese government”
- Kim Hak-Sun1)
Kim Hak-Sun’s words ring in the ears of many Americans of Asian 
ancestry. As we understand it, during World War II the Japanese military 
coerced 200,000 mainly Asian women into sexual slavery. For decades 
Japan’s leaders denied this reality. The mostly Korean former sex slaves 
(euphemistically referred to as “comfort women”) lived in purgatory, with 
their horrific suffering masked by official government denial of their very 
existence.2)
1) eric K. yamamoto, margaret chon, carol l. izumi, Jerry Kang, & FranK h. Wu, race, 
rights and reparation:  laW and the Japanese american internment 435 (2001) [hereinafter 
race, rights and reparation] (2nd ed. forthcoming 2013); Cheah Wui Ling, Walking the Long 
Road in Solidarity and Hope: A Case Study of the “Comfort Women” Movement’s Deployment of 
Human Rights Discourse, 22 harv. hum. rts. J. 63 (2009) (“Angry over the Japanese 
government’s denial, then 69-year-old Kim Hak Sun from South Korea became the first 
former “comfort woman” to publicly speak about her experiences, testifying to the Japanese 
military’s involvement in the “comfort women” system”). 
2) See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2001: Taking 
Responsibility: Moral and Historical Perspectives on the Japanese War-Reparations Issues, 20 
BerKeley J. int’l l. 233, 235 (2002) (“successive Japanese governments engaged in systematic 
denial of . . . the existence of the sex-slave “comfort-women” program”); James Ladino, Ianfu: 
No Comfort Yet For Korean Comfort Women And The Impact Of House Resolution 121, 15 cardozo 
J.l. & gender 333, 337 (2009) (“Japan continued to misrepresent its history by excluding any 
mention of comfort women in textbooks”); Maki Arakawa, A New Forum for Comfort Women: 
Fighting Japan in United States Federal Court, 16 BerKeley Women’s l.J. 174, 181 (2001) (“The 
Japanese government initially denied any military or state involvement in the comfort stations 
. . . . Despite demands made by a Diet member and non-governmental organizations in 1990 
to make disclosures regarding and appropriate reparations to the comfort women, the 
Japanese government continued to deny responsibility”); Susan Jenkins Vanderweert, Seeking 
Justice for “Comfort” Women: Without an International Criminal Court, Suits Brought by World War 
II Sex Slaves of the Japanese Army May Find Their Best Hope of Success in U.S. Federal Courts, 27 
n.c.J. int’l l. & com. reg. 141, 152 (2001) (“After World War II, the Japanese military 
systematically destroyed all records relating to the abduction, housing, and use of sex 
slaves”); Kunihiko Yoshida, Reparations and Reconciliation in East Asia as a Hot Issue of Tort Law 
in the 21st  Century: Case Studies, Legal Issues, and Theoretical Framework, 11 J. Korean l. 101, 112 
(2011) (“former Premier Abe and other cabinet members denied the facts of coerciveness, and 
even the existence of the notorious institution itself in spite of numerous testimonies by 
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Amid the emergence of reparations movements worldwide in the 1990s, 
the former sex slaves brought their justice claims in Japan’s courts and then 
to the Japanese government and to international human rights 
communities.3) Although Japan has denied their claims and has offered 
only limited apologies, the Comfort Women’s struggle for reparatory 
justice has been a key to changing worldwide consciousness about mass 
sexual violence against women during war.4) Even as the surviving 
Comfort Women become fewer in number, their justice claims persist. They 
continue to garner support from Korea’s justice advocates and 
Constitutional Court and from countries and human rights groups 
worldwide, including the U.S. House of Representatives and Asian 
Americans involved in Japanese American internment redress. 
In light of international scrutiny, progress and backsliding, what might 
be the next steps for the Comfort Women and their supporters, particularly 
in terms of strategic framing?  More particularly, viewed through the lens 
of American redress experiences, what might human rights tenets of 
reparatory justice offer established governments faced with challenges to 
their legitimacy as genuine democracies in the face of unredressed historic 
human and civil rights transgressions?
comfort women. Against this backdrop, you can imagine how empty Abe’s expression of 
apology to George Bush sounded to the victims.”).
3) Kristl K. Ishikane, Korean Sex Slaves’ Unfinished Journey for Justice: Reparations from the 
Japanese Government for the Institutionalized Enslavement and Mass Military Rapes of Korean 
Women During World War II, 29 u. haW. l. rev. 123, 127-128 (2006); Byoungwook Park, 
Comfort Women During WWII: Are U.S. Courts a Final Resort for Justice?, 17 am. u. int’l l. rev. 
403, 408-13 (2002); Dana R. Gotfredsen, Seeking Comfort In America: Why An Amendment To The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Is The Most Effective Means Of Holding Foreign Governments 
Accountable For Gender-Based Crimes, 15 emory int’l l. rev. 647 (2001); Afreen R. Ahmed, The 
Shame of Hwang v. Japan: How the International Community Has Failed Asia’s “Comfort Women”, 
14 tex. J. Women & l. 121 (2004).
4) Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim& Abigail M. Holden, American Reparations 
Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1, 61 (2007) [hereinafter Crossroads] 
(citing Joseph P. Nearey, Seeking Reparations in the New Millenium: Will Japan Compensate the 
“Comfort Women” of World War II?, 15 temp. int’l & comp. l.J. 121, 128 (2001)).
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II. Introduction
This essay5) addresses one piece of an analytical framework I have been 
developing for guiding and assessing reparatory justice initiatives 
generally. That framework is called “Social Healing Through Justice.”6) It 
draws upon common tenets among several academic disciplines, including 
social psychology, theology, economics and political theory as well as law 
in order to help actualize the kind of justice that fosters social healing. That 
“healing” focuses on the psychological and financial wounds of those 
injured, their families and their immediate communities. At the same time 
it also targets repairing the damage to the larger society in terms of social 
divisions, guilt and diminished legitimacy as a democratic nation 
professedly but not actually committed to human rights. 
With the “democratic legitimacy” piece of the framework in mind, and 
through a lens of U.S. redress experiences, this essay offers conceptual and 
strategic insights to assist scholars and advocates planning urgent next 
redress steps for the surviving Comfort Women and their families. 
5) This article is based on a presentation at Seoul National University School of Law—
Reparations and Reconciliation between Korea and Japan Focusing on Comfort Women 
Issues, March 27, 2012. The presentation responded to organizers’ request for an assessment 
of the future paths toward Comfort Women’s redress particularly from a U.S. perspective. 
The article draws generally from the redress/reconciliation scholarship in eric K. yamamoto, 
interracial Justice:  conFlict & reconciliation in post-civil rights america (2000); Eric K. 
Yamamoto & Michele Park Sonen, Redress Bias?, implicit Bias across the laW 244 (Levinson & 
Smith eds., 2012) (hereinafter “Redress Bias?”); Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Mackintosh, 
Redress and the Salience of Economic Justice, Oxford F. Pub. Pol’y, Dec. 2010; Eric K. Yamamoto 
& Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress:  A “Social Healing Through Justice” Approach to U.
S.-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 Asian Am. L.J. 5 (2009) 
[hereinafter Reframing Redress]; Crossroads, supra note 4; Eric K. Yamamoto & Liann 
Ebesugawa, Report on Redress:  The Japanese American Internment, in the handBooK oF 
reparations 257 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); Eric K. Yamamoto, Reluctant Redress: The U.S. 
Kidnapping and Internment of Japanese Latin Americans, in BreaKing the cycles oF hatred: 
memory, laW, and repair 132 (Martha Minow ed., 2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: 
Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 19 B.C. L. Rev. 477 (1997); Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Friend, Or Foe or Something Else:  Social Meanings of Redress and Reparations, 20 
denv. J. int’l l. & pol’y 223, 231 (1991) (hereinafter “Social Meanings of Redress”).
6) See generally Reframing Redress, supra note 5, at 28-42.
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This essay draws upon both theory and practical experience7)—a 
praxis—to develop concepts and grounded insights not for their own sake 
but for scholars and advocates engaged in justice efforts.8) With this as 
backdrop, the article assesses a future path toward Comfort Women’s 
redress as seen through the lens of both productive and flawed U.S. 
reparations and reconciliation initiatives and their linkage to democratic 
legitimacy.
III.  U.S. Redress For Incarcerated Americans of Japanese 
Ancestry
As a prelude to the Korean Comfort Women redress movement, 
Japanese Americans struggled in courts and Congress for redress to hold 
the U.S. accountable for its World War II mass racial incarceration of 
120,000 innocent Japanese Americans in harsh internment prisons based on 
the false, indeed fabricated, government claim of “military necessity.”  This 
1980s redress movement effectively announced, “We can no longer tolerate 
the lies of the American government.” In 1988 the U.S. committed to 
7) In addition to the academic disciplines just mentioned, this assessment concerning 
Comfort Women redress, and the framework itself, are also informed by my work as scholar 
and lawyer on several reparatory justice initiatives, including litigating the reopening the 
World War II Japanese American internment case, Korematsu v. U.S. – which laid the legal 
cornerstone for legislative reparations; consulting on reconciliation initiatives between the 
United States and Native Hawaiians seeking self-governance and restoration of culture and 
homelands taken illegally by the U.S. as part of its late 19th century and 20th century 
colonization efforts; consulting on the indigenous Ainu claims for cultural resurrection, land 
return and fair treatment by Japan as result of Japan’s colonization of Hokkaido; serving as 
procedural specialist on the Filipino human rights reparations class action lawsuit against the 
former Ferdinand Marcos regime for political torture and murder and on the African 
American reparations suit for the 1921 Tulsa race riot resulting in death of many African 
Americans; and recently interacting with the family members, academics, officials and 
advocates on incomplete reconciliation/redress efforts concerning the late 1940s and early 
1950s death and destruction on Jeju Island in part during U.S. occupation and later 
supervision.
8) Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in 
Post-Civil Rights America, 95 mich. l. rev. 821 (1997) (calling for serious scholars to engage 
with ground level justice initiatives to better inform progressive scholarship and create 
foundations for practical action).
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comprehensive internment redress—a detailed acknowledgment of the 
violation of fundamental liberties, a presidential apology, individual 
reparations and far-reaching public education.9) 
The 1988 U.S. Civil Liberties Act10) drew upon on a revealing 500-page 
“truth commission” investigation recognizing that the United States 
wrongfully incarcerated 120,000 innocent Americans of Japanese ancestry 
in harsh prisons on a deliberately falsified claim of military necessity—
destroying businesses, homes and families.11) Based on renewed litigation of 
the World War II internment cases in the 1980s and a finding that the race-
based incarceration was caused by “wartime hysteria, race prejudice and a 
failure of political leadership,” the Congressional Act mandated a 
president’s letter of apology to each survivor, 1.4 billion dollars in symbolic 
payments to individuals and millions in financing for public education 
projects (including school books)12) on the history and lessons of the mass 
racial incarceration.13) The Civil Liberties Act was the first such 
comprehensive government redress initiative since Germany’s World War 
II Holocaust reparations14)—and the first ever by the United States.
On an individual level, redress was cathartic—a measure of dignity 
restored. Long-stigmatized with the taint of racial disloyalty, internment 
survivors for the first time could talk about their trauma, even with their 
children. One woman said she felt so much hurt, anger and loss that for 
forty years she could not speak of the imprisonment of her entire 
community by her own government—to anyone. But now, she said, the 
successful fight for redress in courts of both law and public opinion has 
“freed my soul.”15)
On a societal level, the internment redress process provided insights 
9) See generally race, rights and reparation, supra note 1.
10) Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989b-1-9 (2006).
11) commission on Wartime relocation and internment oF civilians, personal Justice 
denied (1982).
12) race, rights and reparation, supra note 1 (one such book for legal scholars and law 
students). 
13) Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 5, at 17-18, 35.
14) holocaust restitution: perspectives on the litigation and its legacy (Michael J. 
Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
15) Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 5, at 517. 
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into the breakdown of democratic checks and balances during national 
distress. It revealed the extraordinary social cost of near-total court 
deference to executive branch and military curtailment of fundamental 
liberties under the false mantle of national security16)—of continuing 
importance after the September 11th attacks in America. And, as developed 
later, it opened the eyes of government and its populace to the political 
value of redress through its strategic linkage to a country’s claim to 
legitimacy as a democracy committed to civil and human rights—a claim 
often integral to a national government’s geopolitical influence. 
Present-day reconciliation movements in the United States and beyond 
often cite internment redress as catalyst or guide. Yet America’s overall 
social healing efforts are unfinished business.
IV.  Global Reach Of Redress Initiatives For Historic 
Injustice
The passage of the 1988 Civil Liberties Act spurred Japanese American 
support for Native Hawaiian and U.S. reconciliation. Urging public support 
for more than words of apology, the President of the Japanese American 
Citizens League Hawai‘i observed, “[W]e recognize that while Japanese 
Americans have received redress and reparations for the injustice of the…
internment, Native Hawaiians [who had their sovereign nation illegally 
overthrown by the United States and lands taken and culture “devastated”] 
have received only an apology for the denial of their sovereign rights and 
the deprivations they have suffered.”17)  
In 1993 the U.S. Congress passed formal apology legislation and 
committed the United States to “reconciliation” with Native Hawaiians to 
begin to heal the 100-year old wounds.18)  In part to bolster U.S. stature as a 
16) Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 5, at 6.
17) S.B. 475: A Bill Relating to Lands Controlled by the State: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Water, Land, Agriculture, and Hawaiian Affairs, 2009 Hawaii Leg. Session (2009) (statement of 
Shawn L.M. Benton, President, JACL Hawai‘i, Honolulu Chapter) available at http://www.
capitol.hawaii.gov/session2009/Testimony/SB475_TESTIMONY_WTL_02-04-09.pdf.
18) Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
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democracy professedly committed to human rights, President Clinton 
apologized to the Native Hawaiian people and his Department of Interior 
advanced a comprehensive reconciliation program targeting Hawaiian self-
governance and land and culture restoration.19) But under President Bush, 
particularly after initiation of the war on terror, and after a U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling,20) the initiative stalled far short of completion.21)  
The U.S.’s unilateral prosecution of the Iraq War and its publicized stark 
human rights violations damaged American moral authority in its effort, in 
part, to foster democracy. In this light, the spotlight brightened on other 
still pending reparations claims against the United States—encompassing 
African Americans (slavery), Native American tribes (restoration of land 
and water), Japanese Latin Americans (interned in the U.S. during World 
War II), Latino “Bracero” farm workers (stolen wages), Mexican Americans 
(coercive deportation of Americans citizens to Mexico during the 
depression), Guatemalans (medical tests subjects) and Filipino war veterans 
(promised benefits). And globally, reconciliation/reparations initiatives 
marked other countries endeavoring to legitimate their transition from 
repressive regimes to bona fide democracies—for example South Africa, 
Sierra Leone, Peru, Argentina, Columbia, Chile, East Timor as well as Sri 
Lanka, Cambodia and Korea.22) The Comfort Women’s struggle for 
reparatory justice—justice that repairs the persisting damage—is a central 
19) See Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice, Report on the 
Reconciliation Process Between the Federal Government and Native Hawaiians: From Mauka to 
Makai: The River of Justice Must Flow Freely (Draft Report) (August 23, 2000). The JRR employed 
language of social healing: The “time has come for the [U.S.] Government and Native 
Hawaiians to join hands to repair the past and build a better future, based upon righteousness 
and justice, and guided by the spirit of healing and aloha to fulfill the goal of reconciliation.” 
Similar in important respects to the CWRIC report, the JRR emphasized the importance of 
governmental apology and need to repair the damage of U.S. wrongdoing.
20) Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
21) In the face of strong continuing Republican Party opposition, President Obama has 
expressed support for reconciliation, but with uncertain results. S. 1011, The Native Hawaiian 
Government Reorganization Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Sam Hirsch, Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen. of the United States).
22) See generally Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 5; In-Sup Han, Kwangju and 
Beyond: Principles for Coping with State Atrocities, International Conference Proceedings: 
Reparations and Reconciliation between Korea and Japan Focusing on Comfort Women 
Issues 75, 83 (Mar. 27, 2012) (on file with author).
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part of this global phenomenon.
Indeed, looking broadly, redressing the deep wounds of injustice has 
become a matter central to the future of civil societies. Whether a country 
heals persisting wounds is increasingly viewed as integral, (1) domestically, 
to enabling its communities to deal with pain, guilt and division linked to 
its past in order to live peaceably and work productively together in the 
present, and (2) globally, to claiming legitimacy as a democracy truly 
committed to civil and human rights (which affects a country’s standing on 
international security and responsible economic development.)23)  People, 
communities and governments—especially democracies claiming 
allegiance to human rights principles—all have a stake in justice that 
repairs. 
This larger stake that democracies have in repairing the persisting 
damage of their injustices lies at the heart of the assessment here of a 
potential future path for Comfort Women redress. To get a better sense of 
how U.S. experiences affect that assessment and strategic framing, consider 
some U.S. connections to the Comfort Women’s redress struggles, with a 
special eye on linkages to U.S. internment redress and its geopolitical 
implications.
V.  The United States And Comfort Women’s Redress 
Movement
1. U.S. Courts
The United States was directly tied to the Comfort Women’s redress 
movement when Comfort Women survivors sought justice in U.S. courts. 
In 2000, after redress efforts in Japan stalled, 15 former Comfort Women 
sued Japan in a United States district court. The women brought a class 
action lawsuit24) on behalf of all sex slaves and their heirs for multiple rapes 
23) See generally Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 5.
24) Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For more analysis see 
Sue R. Lee, Comforting the Comfort Women: Who can Make Japan Pay?, 24 u. pa. J. int’l econ. l. 
509 (2003); David L. Nefouse, The Rights of the Korean Comfort Women and the Wrongful 
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by soldiers, confinement in squalid conditions and physical and mental 
abuse. The class action lawsuit relied on the Alien Torts Claims Act,25) 
which enables foreign individuals to sue other foreigners in U.S. courts for 
certain human rights violations. Ultimately, the federal court dismissed the 
claims, holding that Japan had not waived its sovereign immunity. The 
court also stated that the courts were not the right forum for action, 
recommending instead that survivors’ claims be addressed “government to 
government.”26) The U.S. Supreme Court allowed the dismissal to stand. 
The Comfort Women’s U.S. suit, even though unsuccessful in the court 
of law, became part of international advocacy in the court of public opinion. 
In 2000 the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military 
Sexual Slavery, held in Tokyo, adjudicated Japan’s legal responsibility. The 
Tribunal found Emperor Hirohito and the Japanese government guilty of 
war crimes and urged Japan to provide compensation.27) A year later, the 
Tribunal’s published decision formalized its findings.28) Public testimony 
before and pronouncements by the tribunal helped shape a growing 
international consciousness about the still unredressed injustice.
2. U.S. Congress
The United States continued its ties to the Comfort Women’s redress 
movement in 2007 when the U.S. House of Representatives passed 
Resolution 121.29) With the earlier unsuccessful U.S. litigation in mind, the 
Dismissal of the Joo Case by the District of Columbia Federal Courts, 33 Korean J. int’l & comp. l. 
20 (2005).
25) Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
26) Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52. 
27) Prosecutor v. Japan, Case No. PT-2000-1-T, Preliminary Judgment (Women’s Int’l War 
Crimes Trib. for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery Dec. 12, 2000); Hyunah Yang, A 
Reflection on the “2000 Tribunal” in Tokyo, international Conference Proceedings: 
Reparations and Reconciliation between Korea and Japan Focusing on Comfort Women 
Issues 25 (Mar. 27, 2012) (on file with author).
28) Prosecutor v. Japan, Case No. PT-2000-1-T, Judgment (Women’s Int’l War Crimes 
Trib. for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery Dec. 4, 2001). See also Brooke Say, Ripe for 
Justice: A New UN Tool to Strengthen the Position of the “Comfort Women” and to Corner Japan into 
its Reparation Responsibility, 23 penn st. int’l l. rev. 931 (2005).
29) H.R. Res. 121, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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legislative resolution called for Japan:
1. to clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual 
enslavement and trafficking of the Comfort Women hadn’t 
occurred; 
2. to clearly and unequivocally offer formal acknowledgement, 
apology, and acceptance of historical responsibility for coercion 
of young women into slavery; 
3. to have Japan’s Prime Minister publically and officially apologize 
to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of 
prior government statements; and
4. to educate current and future generations about Japan’s crime 
against humanity while also implementing the international 
community’s recommendations.
 
Congressional Representative Michael M. Honda—a third-generation 
Japanese American and former World War II internment camp detainee—
introduced Resolution 121. He is known in the United States for supporting 
internment redress and in Japan for advocating on behalf of the Comfort 
Women. When Honda introduced the Resolution, he also introduced a 
second resolution commemorating the anniversary of the presidential 
decree authorizing the U.S. World War II racial internment of Americans.30) 
The internment resolution passed almost immediately, but Resolution 121, 
concerning the Comfort Women, triggered a backlash from Japan’s political 
conservatives that stalled congressional consideration. 
Japan’s Prime Minister at the time, Shinzo Abe, publicly contradicted 
the 1993 confession of direct involvement by the Japanese military and 
retracted earlier apologies by Japanese officials. He argued there was no 
evidence establishing that the Japanese military forcibly recruited women 
into sexual slavery. He dismissed the women’s personal accounts and 
warned that Japan would ignore Resolution 121 if passed. Despite a private 
conversation with President Bush,31) Abe’s denials triggered outrage in 
30) H.R. Res. 122, 110th Cong. (2007). 
31) Kunihiko Yoshida, The Comfort Women Reparations’ Agenda: Reasons Why They 
Are Unsuccessful and Ways to Overcome the Obstacles—with Reference to Reparations and 
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parts of Asia and the United States and drew official protests from China, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines.32) 
3. Political Linkage to Internment Redress
In the United States, Asian American supporters of the Comfort Women 
formed a national coalition to support Resolution 121.33) Named the 121 
Coalition, the supporters comprised more than 200 civic organizations 
(including prominent human rights advocates like Amnesty International.) 
The coalition was led mainly by Korean American and Japanese American 
groups34) and rallied participants through contemporary grassroots 
campaigning in the U.S. like street demonstrations and publishing via the 
internet. 
This campaign was “an outgrowth of this strongly legalistic post-
internment [redress] Asian American ethos”35) that a genuine democracy 
Reconciliation in East Asia, in International Conference Proceedings: Reparations and 
Reconciliation between Korea and Japan Focusing on Comfort Women Issues 1 (Mar. 27, 
2012) (on file with author).
32) Norimitsu Onishi, Denial Reopens Wounds of Japan’s Ex-Sex Slaves, n.y. times, March 8, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/08/world/asia/08japan.html. 
33) Parts of the following description are drawn from race, rights and reparations,  supra 
note 1. Coalition 121 represented nearly 200 civic organizations that supported the passage of 
House Resolution 121. During the coalition’s lobbying day, activists and volunteers visited 
over a hundred offices on Capitol Hill to urge legislators to support the resolution. Kinue 
Tokudome, Passage of H.Res. 121 on “Comfort Women”, the US Congress and Historical Memory in 
Japan, the asia-paciFic Journal: Japan Focus, August 30, 2007, available at http://www.
japanfocus.org/-Kinue_TOKUDOME/2510.
34) See generally House Resolution 121, national association oF Korean americans (Mar. 16, 
2007), http://www.naka.org/news/whatsnew.asp?prmno=61 (encouraging support for 
grassroots support of Resolution 121); Bio & Contact, sparK sense, http://www.annabelpark.
com/pages/bio (“born in Seoul, South Korea and immigrated to Houston, TX when she was 
nine years old,” Annabel Park “was the national coordinator for the 121 Coalition”) (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2012); Shogo Kawakita & Miwa Murphy, Some JAs Fear “Comfort Women” 
Resolution Fall Out, nichi Bei times WeeKly, June 28, 2007, available at http://www.jaclchicago.
org/ne-aoi.asp (“the Japanese American Citizens League Chicago Chapter adopted a 
resolution in April formalizing its support for the House resolution” that can be found at 
http://www.jiaponline.org/documents/ChicagoJACL_Comfort_Women_Resolution_04_11_ 
2007.pdf).
35) Christine J. Hung, For Those Who Had No Voice: The Multifaceted Fight For Redress By 
And For The “Comfort Women,” 15 asian am. l. J. 177, 196 (2008). 
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rectifies its gross civil and human rights transgressions. Korean American 
groups reached out to and received support from Asian American 
organizations that had been integral to the passage of the 1988 Civil 
Liberties Act – for instance, the Japanese American Citizens League. 
Diverse Comfort Women supporters asserted that House Resolution 121 
made a compelling public statement to Japan on behalf of Asian American 
women concerned about human rights, democracy and reparatory justice.
Despite heavy Japanese lobbying against the resolution,36) the U.S. 
House unanimously passed it in July 2007. Congressperson Honda 
declared that its passage with bipartisan support “sent a clear message to 
our good friend, the government of Japan, that historical reconciliation is 
not just a concept to be championed, but has very real consequences in the 
lives of the many women institutionally victimized during World War II.” 
The resolution “marks an important step forward in the healing process for 
these women, and brings us closer to demanding accountability and justice 
for present-day crimes against women and young girls.”37)
4. Linkage to International Pressure
In November 2007, following in the U.S. congressional resolution, the 
Dutch House of Representatives urged the Japanese government to provide 
moral and financial support for the surviving Comfort Women and to 
publish the truth in school textbooks.38) The Canadian House of Commons 
36) See generally Japanese Media on Resolution 121, zero (June 28, 2007), http://
zeroempty000.blogspot.com/2007/06/japanese-media-on-resolution-121.html (excerpting 
Japanese media editorials responding to Resolution 121); Opinions from Our Society, Society for 
the Dissemination of Historical Fact, http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_3/result.
php?startview=10&endview=20 (linking to letters responding to Resolution 121 written by an 
organization of Japanese citizens) (last visited Apr. 10, 2012); The Facts, http://www.
occidentalism.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/thefact.jpg (a copy of an advertisement 
originally published in the Washington Post that disputed the facts described by Resolution 
121and was endorsed by various Japanese politicians and academics) (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012).
37) U.S. House of Representatives, House Passes Comfort Resolution, July 30, 2007, http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca15_honda/comfort_women.html. 
38) Netherlands Adopts Resolution on ‘Comfort Women’, Korea times, Nov. 11, 2007, http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/include/print.asp?newsIdx=13505.
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and the European Parliament adopted similar resolutions.39) In 2008 the 
U.N. Human Rights Council on behalf of France, the Netherlands, North 
Korea, South Korea, China and the Philippines urged Japan to redress the 
suffering of the wartime sex slaves.40) The U.N. Human Rights Committee 
also recommended that Japan apologize and accept legal responsibility.41) 
Parliaments in Taiwan and South Korea also demanded justice for 
survivors.42) And Japan’s city councils of Takarazuka, Kiyose and Sapporo 
responded by calling on the national government to heal the Comfort 
Women’s persisting wounds.43)  
And in late 2011, in a judicial pronouncement seen as extraordinary in 
the United States, Korea’s Constitutional Court called upon the Korean 
government to demand that Japan’s government and people confer redress 
for the still-suffering Comfort Women survivors.44) As discussed in the 
39) House of Commons passes motion recognizing Japanese ‘comfort women’, cBc, Nov. 29, 
2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/11/29/comfort-women-motion.
html?ref=rss; Canada MPs demand Japan apologize to WWII ‘comfort women’, aFp, Nov. 28, 2007, 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g2W6b2AKn18yWn-ZEnS9YdknaDBg; Notice Paper 
No. 123 (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.as
px?DocId=2763480&File=11&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&Language=E; Minutes of 
Proceedings Meeting No. 12 (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2805595&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&Language=
E; Resolution on Comfort Women, Eur. Parl. Doc. RC-B6-0525/2007 (Dec. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P6-RC-2007-
0525&language=EN.
40) Northeast Asian History Foundation, Historical Controversy: Comfort Women (2007), 
http://english.historyfoundation.or.kr/?sidx=209&stype=2; NGO Shadow Report to 
CEDAW, 44th Sess. (2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/
docs/ngos/ComfortWomen_Japan_cedaw44.pdf. 
41) Human Rights Committee Concludes Ninety-Fourth Session, united nations human 
rights (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=9344&LangID=E; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, 
94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5 (Dec. 18, 2008).
42) Taiwan OK’s bill seeking Japan “comfort women” apology, reuters, Nov. 11, 2008, http://
in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/11/idINIndia-36440120081111; Taiwan and South Korea call for 
‘comfort women’ apology, amnesty international (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.amnesty.org/
en/news-and-updates/news/taiwan-and-south-korea-call-comfort-women-apology-20081118.
43) Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2009 - Japan, May 28, 2009, http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a1fade073.html; see also NGO Shadow Report to CEDAW, 
supra note 40.
44) Decision of Aug. 31, 2011, 2006Hun-ma788 (Constitutional Court of Korea). 
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concluding section, Korea’s president and the South Korean Ambassador to 
Japan followed up with executive branch demands for redress for the 
human rights violations.
The United States’ ties to the Comfort Women’s redress movement also 
continued in 2011. The Korean American Voters’ Council together with the 
Kupferberg Holocaust Resource Center and Archives hosted a summit in 
New York that highlighted the redress efforts of Comfort Women 
survivors.45) The summit brought two Korean Comfort Women to New 
York to meet and share with Holocaust survivors. And it concluded with 
collective requests for an official apology and compensation from the 
Japanese government, a Comfort Women memorial in the U.S., an art 
exhibition, and an Asian history internship program. It was “the first step 
to a full-fledged [American-based] . . . lobby to promote the issues related 
to comfort women.”46)
5.  Calling into Question Japan’s Legitimacy as a Democracy Committed 
to Human Rights
Reflecting on Japan’s past atrocities, a commentator recently observed, 
“With [Japan’s] political and economic leaders evidently reassessing the 
costs of endless stonewalling, and the potential benefits of smoother foreign 
relations [on matters of security] and enhanced business prospects, Japan 
now appears to be” feeling the international pressure to right its historical 
injustices.47) As developed later, the international outcry over Japan’s failure 
to provide redress for the Comfort Women, along with Asian countries’ 
continuing charges of unredressed World War II Japanese military atrocities, 
have publicly called into question Japan’s legitimacy as a democracy 
professedly committed to human rights. 
A genuine democracy abides by the rule of law and human rights 
45) Korean american voters’ council, http://kavc.org/xe/eng (last visited Apr. 12, 
2012).
46) Dongchan Shin, Korean “Comfort Women” Demand Apology, Korea daily, Dec. 21, 2011, 
available at http://voicesofny.org/2011/12/korean-comfort-women-meet-with-holocaust-
survivors/.
47) William Underwood, Redress Crossroads in Japan, August 2, 2010, the asia-paciFic 
Journal, reprinted in History News Network, http://www.hnn.us/articles/129714. 
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principles. If that democracy violates the human rights of others and then 
refuses to acknowledge and repair the damage, then that country’s 
democratic legitimacy can rightfully be challenged by judges, scholars, 
advocates and political leaders.48)
As discussed later, the apparent damage to Japan’s democratic 
legitimacy has geopolitical consequences, and it generates strategic 
openings. It diminishes U.S. and other political leaders’ ability to support 
Japan’s efforts to expand its military and extend its international influence 
through the United Nations. One key route back toward restored 
legitimacy for Japan is demonstrated compliance with international human 
rights principles of reparatory justice, particularly for the Comfort Women.
VI.  Democratic Legitimacy And International Human 
Rights Principles Of Reparatory Justice
1.  “Social Healing Through Justice”: Shaping and Evaluating Redress 
Initiatives
The “Social Healing Through Justice framework”49) mentioned earlier 
draws from several academic disciplines and practical redress experiences, 
including Japanese American redress, to offer an approach for shaping and 
evaluating redress or reconciliation initiatives aimed at engendering 
genuine healing for those still suffering and for society itself. The 
framework engages individuals, communities, justice organizations, 
businesses and governments in a dynamic process of recognition, 
responsibility, reconstruction and reparation—the “Four Rs”50)—with the goal 
48) See Yamamoto, Crossroads, supra note 4 (linking democratic legitimacy to strategic 
demands for reparations).
49) In short, the Social Healing Through Justice framework aims: 1) to provide an analytical 
structure grounded in common points among respected academic disciplines, 2) which draws 
insights from the successes and failures of actual redress initiatives, 3) and employs a 
common language that attempts to speak to the hearts and minds of communities in conflict, 
4) while serving as a strategic guide for shaping, and then assessing, reparatory justice 
initiatives.
50) Diverse disciplines highlight four aspects about the kind of justice that fosters social 
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of shaping and implementing redress or reconciliation initiatives to foster 
the kind of justice that heals. In doing so, the framework seeks to generate a 
convergence of interests among participants so that all see a stake in the 
initiative. 
2.  A Country’s Legitimacy As a Democracy Committed to Human Rights
For national polities, a key stake is restoring democratic legitimacy 
through redress for the government’s human rights transgressions, 
including unjust military actions, authoritarian political suppression or past 
colonial land confiscation and culture destruction.
International human rights principles prohibit slavery, torture, political 
healing: recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation. These four points of inquiry 
“assist groups and governments first in shaping a particular redress initiative and then in 
assessing whether the effort is on the path toward genuine social healing.”
Recognition “addresses the psychological” by examining the historical, cultural, and 
structural context for past and continuing suffering. By investigating the ways in which 
individuals “continue to suffer pain, fear, shame and anger,” by decoding “cultural stereotypes 
that seemingly legitimize” injustice, and by scrutinizing “the ways that organizational 
structures” contribute to the injustice, participants can arrive at a recognition of the harm that 
paves the way for future healing.
Responsibility includes both “assessment of power over others” and “acceptance of 
responsibility of repairing the damage . . . imposed on others through power abuses.” By 
focusing not only on the assessment of responsibility, but also on acceptance of the 
responsibility to act, the mutual engagement of participants that leads to successful healing is 
ensured.
Reconstruction aims to build “new productive relationship[s].” Effectively building the 
kind of relationships needed for successful healing and a sense of justice restored might 
include of “apologies and forgiveness,” reframing the “history of interaction,” and the 
“reallocation of political and economic power.” Reallocation of power, through change in a 
“state’s social, legal or political institutions and policies” is an important part of reconstruction 
as it can assure underlying abuses will not be repeated.
Reparations, while it may include restitution, monetary payments, and “medical, legal, or 
educational and financial support for individuals and communities in need,” encompasses 
more than money. Reparations may also include rehabilitation, “restoration of property, 
rebuilding of culture, economic development” and public education. Public education 
particularly can serve to “commemorate, impart lessons learned, and . . . generate a new 
justice narrative about a democracy’s commitment to civil and human rights.” Yamamoto, 
Reframing Redress, supra note 5. See generally Alfred Brophy, Reparations Pro and Con (2007); 
Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in 
Reparations Programs, 31 u. pa. J. int’l l. 257, 267 (2009). 
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murder, mass rape and systemic racial discrimination. In addition, the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that victims of 
these and other gross human rights violations “shall have an effective 
remedy.”51) That remedy includes but extends well beyond monetary 
payments.52) It encompasses measures aimed at social healing, including 
acknowledgements of wrongdoing, public apologies, economic capacity 
building, property restoration, memorials, education and legal changes.53) 
In 2006 the United Nations General Assembly embraced broad reparatory 
remedies by adopting the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law.”54) These principles specify forms of repair for victims of serious 
violations, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and 
guarantees of non-repetition. 
These remedial norms broadly shape reparatory justice for systemically 
inflicted group-based harms, and they bear on how “legitimacy as a 
democracy” accrues. That legitimacy has two different yet related layers: 
internal and external.55) Internal legitimacy accrues when a country’s 
51) Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in 
international Bill oF rights: the covenant on civil and political rights 325 (Louise Henkin 
ed., 1981). It is noteworthy that the human rights edifice has both supporters and critics. “The 
overall international human rights regime has appropriately been extolled for its articulation 
of progressive values and aspirational norms that transcend national borders…. Critics charge 
[however, that the three-tier hierarchical structure of human rights instruments] perpetuates 
the hegemony of powerful countries, particularly the United States. They contend that by 
recognizing only-first-generation human rights, which mirror domestic rights already in 
place, the United States is authorized to intervene in recalcitrant countries’ political affairs 
under the banner of human rights without risking `reverse intervention’ in U.S. affairs.” Eric 
K. Yamamoto, Carrie Ann Y. Shirota & Jayna Kanani Kim, Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in 
U.S. Courts, in moral imperialism: a critical anthology 300, 310 (Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol ed., 2002) (describing support and criticism). 
52) Han, supra note 22, at 91 (encompassing honor, restoration and commemoration).
53) See Yamamoto, Crossroads, supra note 4.
54) Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, C.H.R. Res. 2005/35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.11 
(Apr. 19, 2005).
55) Eric K. Yamamoto, Sara Lee & Yea Jin Lee, Redress and the U.S. Role in the Jeju 4.3 
Incident (forthcoming 2012); see also Han, supra note 22, at 85.
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citizens believe that overall their government abides by democratic 
values—it supports fair elections, majority rule and an independent 
judiciary—and that it protects the basic rights and liberties of its people. 
But democratic legitimacy also has an external, or geopolitical, layer that 
is strategically relevant to Comfort Women redress. Theologian Reinhold 
Niebuhr aptly explains the accrual of this kind of legitimacy. When a 
government and its people systematically violate the human rights of 
others, “[d]emocracy requires the correction of oppression or consequences 
of oppression.”56) And, in the eyes of international communities, “the 
correction of oppression” entails repairing the damage inflicted according 
to the human rights norms of reparatory justice just described. Policymakers 
and justice advocates from democracies thus coalesce around this precept: 
redress for injuries of past injustice is foundational to legitimacy of a 
democracy committed to civil and human rights.57)
A country’s perceived external democratic legitimacy becomes 
especially important when it needs the support of other democratic 
countries. When a country wears a cloak of legitimacy, the other more 
established countries are better able to persuade their own sometimes 
reluctant citizenry that they must provide that support in order to promote 
global democracy, security and responsible economic development. In this 
way, geopolitical pressure for (and interest in) recognition and acceptance 
of responsibility for historic harms is increasingly linked to the legitimacy 
of present-day democratic governance. 
56) Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Race, Gender, And Class At A Crossroads: A Survey Of Their 
Intersection In Employment, Economics, And The Law: Third National People Of Color Conference 
Article: Why Reparations to African Descendants in the United States Are Essential to Democracy, 14 
J. gender race & Just. 633, 634 (2011) (citing numerous additional scholars). See Kyeyoung 
Park, Japan, U.S. And World War Ii: The Search For Justice: The Unspeakable Experiences of Korean 
Women under Japanese Rule, 21 Whittier l. rev. 567 (2000) (discussing the systemic oppression 
and the broader context of which the Korean Comfort Women experience was part); Etsura 
Totsuka, Commentary On A Victory For “Comfort Women”: Japan’s Judicial Recognition Of Military 
Sexual Slavery, 8 pac. rim l. & pol’y J. 47, 48 (1999) (“the “Comfort Women” system was a 
manifestation of sexism and racism of the time which severely violated the dignity of women 
and profoundly damaged racial pride; and that it is not the past issue but the ongoing human 
rights issue”).
57) Yamamoto, Crossroads, supra note 4, at 6; Thomas Antkowiak, Remedy Approaches to 
Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond 46 colum. J. 
transnat’l l. 351, 357 (2008).
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One historic illustration is Germany’s Holocaust redress. West Germany 
established the post-World War II German state as a bona fide democracy 
in part through its program of comprehensive and sustained redress for 
Holocaust victims. In addition to payments and some property restoration, 
redress encompassed extensive education about the atrocity and acceptance 
of responsibility for repairing (as best possible) the horrific human damage.58) 
These efforts not only demonstrated contrition and accountability, they 
showed serious commitment to emerging international human rights 
principles of rehabilitation, restitution, reparation and non-recurrence as 
the foundation for reparatory justice. And they have been part of the 
foundation of external legitimacy that facilitated democratic countries’ 
strong support for Germany and contributed to its sustained rise in Europe 
as a peaceable and productive democracy.59)
A second illustration is Japanese American internment redress. Initially, 
in the early 1980s, President Reagan’s administration opposed redress. 
Indeed, it fought hard against the 1984 Korematsu litigation that successfully 
reopened the original World War II internment legal challenge.60) Why then 
did President Reagan support the Civil Liberties Act redress in 1988 with 
seeming enthusiasm? One realpolitik explanation for that turn around was 
the United States’ push to win the end stage of the Cold War, which had 
been framed as a political struggle of American democracy against Soviet 
communism. Highly publicized internment redress enabled the United 
States to portray democracy as bolstering (if belatedly) human rights 
principles of reparatory justice (“we correct our mistakes”) and therefore as 
58) holocaust restitution: perspectives on the litigation and its legacy, supra note 14.
59) Celestine Bohlen, Euro Unity? It’s Germany That Matters, n.y. times, Mar. 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/world/europe/10iht-letter.html (discussing 
Germany’s economic importance in the European Union); Stephen Brown, Analysis: Germany 
in two minds over leadership role, reuters, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/02/08/us-germany-leadership-idUSTRE8171F220120208 (discussing Germany’s global 
role).
60) Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (coram nobis proceeding vacating 
Fred Korematsu’s 1944 conviction for refusing the World War II raced-based military 
exclusion orders based on findings of “manifest injustice”, undercutting the factual 
underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s earlier decision affirming the exclusion (Korematsu v. 
U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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standing as morally superior to communism.61)
VII.  Strategically Framing Redress Advocacy in Terms of 
Japan’s Questionable Legitimacy as a Democracy 
Professedly But Not Actually Committed to Human 
Rights
In many respects, Japan’s minimalist, even regressive, path toward 
redress appears to have salted rather than healed the wounds of the 
Comfort Women and their survivors and rightly provoked international 
condemnation. 
The Japanese government has conferred no direct reparations,62) has not 
fully acknowledged its role and has not undertaken educational programs. 
Instead, it attempted to dilute its responsibility by creating the non-
governmental Asian Women’s Fund and encouraging privately paid 
reparations. The government’s refusal to contribute to the fund rendered it 
practically meaningless to most surviving Comfort Women.63) With the 
2007 termination of the Fund, what meaningful measures, if any, is Japan 
taking to heal the persisting wounds of the surviving Comfort Women64) 
and restore the damage to Japan’s reputation as a democracy professedly 
but not actually committed to human rights principles?  And more 
particularly, what strategic framing of future possibilities might help 
generate the kind of interest-convergence65) that compels Japan to seriously 
61) See Yamamoto, Social Meanings of Redress, supra note 7, at 231; Yamamoto, Crossroads, 
supra note 4.
62) Yoshida, supra note 31, at 4.
63) Shellie K. Park, Broken Silence: Redressing The Mass Rape and Sexual Enslavement of Asian 
Women by the Japanese Government in an Appropriate Forum, 3 asian-paciFic. & pol’y J. 2, 44-46 
(2002); Christine J. Hung, For Those Who Had No Voice: The Multifaceted Fight For Redress By And 
For The “Comfort Women,” 15 asian am. l. J. 177, 191-192 (2008).
64) Christina Lope Yl. Rosello, Psychotherapeutic Approaches for Traumatized War Victims: 
Filipino Comfort Women, in international conFerence proceedings: reparations and 
reconciliation BetWeen Korea and Japan Focusing on comFort Women issues 61, 61 (Mar. 27, 
2012) (on file with author).
65) Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 harv. 
l. rev. 518 (conceiving the interest-convergence thesis for civil rights progress).
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re-invest in Comfort Women redress?  
The conceptual and experiential insights described in the preceding 
sections provide a possible strategic framing path for future next steps as 
the Comfort Women redress campaign enters what may be a decisive 
phase. The final part of this essay does not attempt to chart a detailed 
blueprint or analyze all of the complex pieces. Rather, it endeavors to 
coalesce the aforementioned concepts and specific language in a way that 
may prove theoretically sound and practically useful in moving Japan 
toward genuine redress for the Comfort Women.
What follows is one such strategic framing. It matters to Japan how 
other countries view its stated commitment to human rights. For many 
politicians, human rights organizations, media watchdogs and voters in 
established democracies, including the United States, an expanded 
Japanese military role in regional and global security is cause for concern 
unless Japan renounces its past military atrocities through a demonstrated 
(as distinguished from merely verbal) commitment to human rights.66) That 
concern is exacerbated by the United States support for Japan’s planned 
military expansion in light of Japan’s unredressed human rights violations.
Might Japan’s need for democratic legitimacy in the face of strong 
international criticism of its unredressed human rights abuses trigger 
important advances in Comfort Women redress? Possibly not. Geopolitical 
pressure points often change rapidly. And Japan’s politics are complex. Yet, 
possibly so—particularly when international human rights criticisms align 
with and are intensified by specific events that in turn intensify Japan’s 
need for geopolitical support.67)
Consider the dynamics of Japan’s recognition of the Ainu as a formerly 
colonized indigenous people entitled to rights to restorative justice.68) Japan 
devastated the life and culture and took lands of the Ainu of Hokkaido 
66) See Yamamoto, Crossroads, supra note 4.
67) The suggestions here and the account of possible geopolitical influences are 
necessarily brief and incomplete. They are offered not as comprehensive analysis but rather as 
indicators of strategic framing possibilities. They are offered to spur further research and 
advocacy.
68) Mark Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of 
Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 nyu J. 
int’l l. & pol. 419 (2001).
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through late-19 th century colonization and 20 th century harsh 
discrimination.69)  But Japan staunchly resisted for decades recognizing the 
rights of the Ainu as an indigenous people. Human rights organizing from 
many directions in the summer of 2008 pushed the Ainu back into 
governmental consciousness and compelled Japan to reverse course. As 
Japan sought to temper China’s growing economic and military power and 
to regularize relations with North and South Korea and as Japan lobbied for 
a seat on the UN Security Council and an expanded military presence in the 
Asia region, it faced criticism from neighboring countries and international 
human rights groups about its dismal record of past human rights abuses 
and its continuing refusal to redress the persisting harms. Amid this human 
rights clamor, and with Japanese leaders’ rhetoric of healing as a backdrop, 
Ainu calls for justice gained political traction. In May 2008 thousands of 
Ainu and supporters demonstrated in Tokyo, demanding recognition of the 
Ainu as an indigenous people entitled to restorative justice.70)  
Building on years of organizing and several proposed plans for 
remediation, the protest preceded by two months the internationally-
scrutinized 2008 Group of Eight Summit (the world’s eight economic 
powers) on the Ainu’s former homelands in Hokkaido.71) The Summit 
planned to focus not only on economic policy but also on issues integral to 
Ainu lands and culture, including climate change and environmental 
sustainability. A new generation of Ainu advocates and international 
groups stepped up criticism of Japan’s human rights record with an 
emphasis on its treatment of the Ainu.
In a startling but now understandable pre-emptive maneuver one 
month before the Summit, Japan’s parliament unanimously recognized the 
69) Kunihiko Yoshida, Ainu Minzoku no Hoshou Mondai―Minpougaku karano Kinji no 
Yuushikisha Kondankai Houkokusho no Hihanteki Kousatu [The Reparations for the Ainu people: A 
Critical Analysis of the Recent Commission’s Report from the Civil Law Perspective], 28 nomos 
(Kansai univ.) 19, 33-35, 39-41 (2011).
70) See Catherine Makino, Indigenous People: Japan Officially Recognises Ainu, inter press 
service neWs agency, June 11, 2007, http://ipsnews.net/news.aspidnows=42738; Masami Ito, 
Ainu Press Case for Official Recognition, Japantimes, May 23, 2008, http://search.Japantimes.
co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080523a4.html; Interview with Kenichi Ochiai, University of Hokkaido 
School of Law, at Honolulu, Haw (Sept. 29, 2008). 
71) Overview of the Summit, g8 hoKKaido toyaKo summit, http://g8-summit.town.toyako.
hokkaido.jp/eng/summit/about/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
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Ainu as an indigenous people. The Chief Cabinet Secretary then stated that 
“the government would like to solemnly accept the historical fact that 
many Ainu people were discriminated against and forced into poverty with 
the advancement of modernization.” Some criticized the words of 
recognition as “not enough.”72) Others saw it as a significant next step. The 
Parliament then created the “Advisory Panel of Eminent Persons on 
Policies for the Ainu People” to formulate national and local government 
Ainu restoration policies “by referring to the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.” The “most important starting point [was the Ainu 
people’s requests along with ensuring] the public accurately understand 
the history and grasp the situation of the Ainu.” Redress progress in 2008 
emerged from a confluence of events and coordinated human rights 
challenges to Japan’s governmental legitimacy.73)  
Today Japan continues to profess a commitment to human rights in an 
effort to bolster its stature as a credible democracy entitled to full 
participation in global security and development. It reaffirmed its assent to 
human rights instruments and is now asserting that it was ready to “play a 
responsible role for world peace and stability.” It seeks a non-permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council for 2016-17, while attempting to expand 
permanent membership to include Japan, Brazil, Germany and India.74)  
But, on the international stage, countries and organizations concerned 
about Japan’s past atrocities publicly question Japan’s commitment to 
human rights. In this setting the Japanese government and private 
companies resolved reparations claims by World War II slave laborers.75) 
And during December 2011 summit talks, South Korean President Lee 
72) Masami Ito, Diet Officially Declares Ainu Indigenous, Japantimes, June 7, 2008,http://
search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20080607a1.html.
73) Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 5, at 64-66. Some proactive steps followed. 
As international pressure lessened over ensuing years, however, both the national and local 
governments appear to have quietly retreated.
74) See Japan to Seek Nonpermanent UN Security Council Seat for 2016-2017, BBc monitoring 
int’l reports, Jan. 11, 2011, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-
246245563/japan-seek-nonpermanent-un.html (quoting Japan’s foreign minister); India, Brazil, 
Germany, Japan Demand Security Council Reform This Year, merco press, Feb. 12, 2011, http://
en.mercopress.com/2011/02/12/india-brazil-germany-japan-demand-security-council-
reform-this-year.
75) See Yamamoto, Redress Bias?, supra note 7, at 244. 
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Myung-bak pressed Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda to become 
“true partners for peace and stability” and settle the Comfort Women 
justice claims.76) South Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-Soo stepped 
up the pressure, conveying that the “issue of comfort women was raised 
during the 1990s and, over the past 20 years, it has become the largest 
remaining symbolic issue (to be resolved) in [our] two countries’ history.”77) 
He added, “From our standpoint, we will work [with Japan] to find a 
solution that is acceptable to the victims. But if that fails, we have no option 
but to undertake the process for an arbitration panel [under the 1965 treaty] 
. . . . In order to avoid such a step, (we) plan to urge the Japanese government 
for a swift and smooth solution.”  
The forthrightness and firmness of these directives not only took Japan’s 
leaders by surprise, they also reverberated through Japan’s populace. And 
the human rights pressure for redress continues to build. During a February 
2012 meeting with former special rapporteur on the UN Human Rights 
Council, Gay McDougall, South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan 
announced that, “When [the Comfort Women] all pass away, the Japanese 
government will be left with a debt that can never be redeemed. . . . As such, 
my government is determined to do everything it can.”78) McDougall added 
that “[t]he Japanese government’s argument that Japan has already settled 
all claims from the Second World War through peace treaties and 
reparations agreements following the war are unpersuasive.”79) She 
concluded, “If the government of Japan is non-responsive to . . . arbitration, 
the government of Korea should consider initiating a proceeding against 
76) S. Korean Envoy Vows to Press Japan Over Wartime Sex Slaves, yonhap neWs agency, 
Feb. 21, 2012, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/02/21/44/0301000000AEN20
120221008800315F.HTML; Lee Tae-hoon, Lee press Japan on ‘comfort women’, Koreatimes, Dec. 
18, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/include/print.asp?newsIdx=101053. 
77) S. Korean Envoy, supra note 76.
78) See Japan Liable for Wartime Sex Slaves, Crimes Against Humanity: Ex-UN Envoy, the 
Korea times, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/02/ 
120_105104.html. 
79) Id. See also S. Korean FM to Meet with UN Rapporteur Over Wartime Sex Slaves, 
crienglish.com, Feb. 14, 2012, http://english.cri.cn/6966/2012/02/14/3123s680980.htm; 
Fmr. UN Human Rights Rapporteur Says 1965 Korea-Japan ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Didn’t Cover 
Human Rights Issue, arirang, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.as
p?nseq=126148&code=Ne2&category=2.
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Japan before the International Court of Justice” for human rights violations. 
What additional geopolitical events might coalesce at a given time to 
finally compel Japan to seek to enhance or preserve its democratic 
legitimacy by taking concrete enduring redress actions? Maybe nothing 
will. 
But consider additional recent developments implicating Japan’s 
damaged legitimacy as a democracy. In 2011 the Korean Constitutional 
Court directed the national government to take affirmative steps to engage 
Japan in moving the human rights redress process forward,80) and the 
Korean government worked on a proposal for a Japan-involved Comfort 
Women human rights arbitration panel. Japan continued to resist, relying 
on its old 1965 treaty settlement argument.81) International law scholars and 
human rights advocates reacted harshly. Comfort Women redress is a 
humanitarian matter left unaddressed by the treaty they said.82) And, they 
might have strategically added, it is a matter central to Japan’s global stature 
as a democracy actually committed to human rights as it seeks to rebuild its 
economy and expand its power and influence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This suggested reframing of Comfort Women redress claims, for the 
reasons developed in this article, responds to the urgent questions posed at 
the outset:  In light of international scrutiny, progress and backsliding, what 
might be the next steps for the Comfort Women and their supporters, 
particularly in terms of strategic framing? More particularly, viewed 
through the lens of American redress experiences, and particularly the U.S. 
apology and reparations for the Japanese American World War II 
80) S. Korean Envoy, supra note 76.
81) Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, Japan: Submitted by Japan Fellowship 
of Reconciliation (JFOR), a non-governmental organization in special consultative status Postwar 
responsibilities of Japan: “Comfort Women”, military sexual slavery—non_fulfillment of obligations 
for apology, compensation, and punishment and the criticism of the treaty defense by Japan (Feb. 8, 
2008), available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session2/JP/JFOR_JPN_
UPR_S2_2008_JapanFellowshipofReconciliation_uprsubmission.pdf
82) Id.
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internment, what might human rights tenets of reparatory justice offer 
established governments faced with challenges to their legitimacy as 
genuine democracies in the face of unredressed historic human and civil 
rights transgressions?
IX. Epilogue
Amid recent events two aging Korean Comfort Women visited the 
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations in New York. In late 
2011 they traveled to the United States to intensify awareness about the 
Comfort Women redress struggle.83) In doing so they shared stories with 
women who had survived the Holocaust. And the women demanded that 
Japan’s government issue an issue apology to and provide reparations for 
the Comfort Women and their families and to thereby begin to redeem 
Japan’s damaged reputation as a democracy in the modern world.84) We 
can, they effectively said, “no longer tolerate the lies of the Japanese 
government.” The time for “social healing through justice” is now. 
83) Korean american voters’ council, http://kavc.org/xe/eng (last visited Apr. 12, 
2012).
84) Kisu Park, Comfort Women Take Case to Japan’s UN Mission, Korea daily, Dec. 28, 2011, 
available at http://voicesofny.org/2011/12/comfort-women-japan-un/; Shin, supra note 46.

